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Abstract. The condentiality of encrypted data depends on how well
the key under which it was encrypted is maintained. If a session key
was exchanged encrypted under a long-term key, exposure of the long-
term key may reveal the session key and hence the data encrypted with
it. The problem of key-dependencies between keys can be mapped onto
connectivity of a graph, and the resulting graph can be inspected. This
article presents a structured method (an algorithm) with which key-
dependencies can be detected and analysed. Several well-known protocols
are examined, and it is shown that they are vulnerable to certain attacks
exploiting key-dependencies. Protocols which are free from this defect do
exist. That is, when a session is terminated it is properly closed.
1 Introduction
In principle, any message that flows through a communication network can be
recorded by eavesdroppers. Recording a message implies that the contents of the
message can be revealed at any later time, even after both the sender and the
intended receiver of the message have destroyed it. The contents of a message
ceases to exist when no copy of the message exists in the system. It is obvious that
two communicating partners are unable to enforce the extinction of messages
exchanged between them.
Distribution of session keys among communication partners is a task that is
accomplished using an authentication protocol. A closer look at authentication
protocols reveals, not surprisingly, that many are constructed such that the ses-
sion key is conveyed to the parties by means of messages. If the session key has
been sent in a message, encrypted using some long-term key, then the session key
does not cease to exist before the long-term key is destroyed. The term depen-
dency will be used to describe the relationship that comes into existence between
keys when one secret key is sent encrypted by another secret key, e.g., when the
session key is encrypted by a long-term key. The eect of key-dependency is that
the long-term secrecy of the session depends on the secrecy of the long-term key.
It also influences the quality of the session key. The longer a long-term key is
in use, the higher the risk of compromise, and the session key is exposed to
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the same risk through the dependency. When a key-dependency arises from a
protocol the assumption that a key is secret is transformed into an assumption
that the key will remain secret. Thus, the protocol alters the assumptions, or,
the way by which the assumptions are used alters them. This property is called
forward secrecy [5].
When a session key depends on a long-term key the session is not closed before
both the long-term key and the session key is destroyed. A session is not closed
before the only way to obtain access to the data is by means of cryptanalysis.
In other words, key-dependency is a security problem since it provides potential
attackers with options.
As an example, consider the Kerberos protocol [11] outlined below:
Message 1 A! S : A;B
Message 2 S ! A : fTS ; KAB; B; fTS ; KAB; AgKBSgKAS
Message 3 A! B : fTS ; KAB; AgKBS ; fA; TAgKAB
Message 4 B ! A : fTA + 1gKAB
In the protocol description, A and B are the two principals that want to commu-
nicate, S is a server trusted by A and B to provide proofs on user/key bindings,
KXY is the secret key shared between principals X and Y and TX is a time
stamp made by X. The notation is adopted from [3]. The protocol description
is slightly simplied, see [11] for more details.
In the protocol, the session key KAB is sent in messages, encrypted with both
KAS and KBS , in Message 2 and 3, respectively. When a short-term key (KAB)
is encrypted with a long-term key (in fact two keys, both KAS and KBS), a
dependency is created between the short- and long-term keys. The implication
is that the session based on KAB is not properly closed before all the three keys
KAB; KAS and KBS have been discarded. The secrecy of the session depends on
the long-term secrecy of the keys KAS and KBS and to properly close a session
in the Kerberos system, both the keys KAS and KBS must be destroyed. The
long-term privacy of A and B thus rests on the honesty of S as the protocol is
in progress (e.g., S discards KAB as soon as Message 2 has been sent) and the
management of S after the protocol is terminated.
This paper presents an algorithm for analysing protocols for dependencies.
Armed with it, designers and users of authentication protocols can analyse pro-
tocols in order to obtain a better understanding of the side eects of running
them. Basically, the algorithm maps the dependencies onto connectivity in a
graph. The resulting graph can be inspected to determine key-dependencies.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. First, in Section 2 a method
to analyse protocols for key-dependencies is presented. The method consists of
an algorithm which can be applied to a protocol description to produce a graph,
and a description of how the resulting graph should be interpreted. Then, in
Section 3, several well known protocols are analysed, both to demonstrate the
usefulness of the method and to show the protocols’ properties in respect to key-
dependencies. Section 4 contains the discussion and an outline of future work.
At the end, in Section 5, the conclusions are presented.
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2 Analysing dependencies
This section outlines a structured method to detect and analyse key-dependencies
in key-distribution protocols. The idea is to model the problem of locating key-
dependencies as determining the connectivity of a directed graph, and the graph
can be inspected in order to detect key-dependencies that render sessions open.
More precisely, a key distribution protocol is represented as a directed graph.
In such a graph G, the members of the set of vertices V (G) represents either
data|stemming from the receipt of a message, generated locally or the result of
a decryption|or transformations such as decryption. An element (x; y) of the
set of edges E(G) represents the fact that y is derived from x. For example, if y
is the \result" of decrypting x, then (x; y) 2 E(G). The graph is then interpreted
according so certain rules, and the interpretation reveals information about the
protocol. Vertices are drawn as nodes containing a string identifying the data or
transformation. Edges are drawn as arches.
Modelling key-dependencies as a graph is closely related to the methods
described in [7], where a graph is built to detect the weakest (shortest) path
between passwords that can be guessed (or text that can be veried) and a
session key. A similar approach is used here to detect key-dependency properties
in authentication and key-distribution protocols.
The set V (G) of vertices in the key-dependency graph G is dened as follows:
V1. The set V (G) has one element for each message, for each message com-
ponent, and for each key necessary to decrypt the message. For instance, if
message m = hx; yi is considered, then m; x; y 2 V (G). Moreover, if a conven-
tional cryptosystem is used and the message m = fx; ygk is considered, then
V (G) contains one element for the message m itself, one element for each
message component (i.e., m; x; y 2 V (G)), and one element for the key k.
Similarly, if a public-key cryptosystem is used and the message m = fx; ygk
is considered, then m; x; y 2 V (G) as above, and k−1 2 V (G), where k−1 is
the decryption key corresponding to the public encryption key k.
V2. The set V (G) has one element for the computation a principal has to per-
form in order to obtain the key (or other material) on the material received
through messages, in its clear-text form, or local information1. Moreover, the
set of vertices contains one element for each argument of the computation
and one for the result. For instance, if the computation y = f(x1; : : : ; xn) is
considered, then f; y; xi 2 V (G); i = 1; : : : ; n.
Notice that by V1, when two messages containing the same datum, e.g., the
messages m1 = ha; xi; m2 = hb; xi, the resulting set of vertices will have ve
elements (m1; m2; a; b; x) as x is one datum transmitted twice.
The set of edges E(G) is dened as follows
E1. Let m be a message with n components, m = hm1 ; : : : ; mni. Then, (m;mi) 2
E(G); i = 1; : : : ; n.
1 This computation is of course dierent from the computation that a principal has to
perform in order to build up a message.
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E2. Let m = fxgk be a message where x is encrypted with shared-key en-
cryption. A pair of elements are added to E(G), namely (m; x) and (k; x).
Public-key encryption can be characterized similarly: if m = fxgk is consid-
ered, then the edges (m; x) and (k−1; x) are added.
E3. If a computation y = f(x1; : : : ; xn) is considered, then (f; y); (xi; f) 2 E(G).
For instance the message hA;B; fXgKi, where K is a shared key, yields the
following graph. Each arch is labelled with the rule that applies to it.
A A;B; fXgKE1oo
E1

E1 // fXgK
E2

K
E2||yy
yy
yy
yy
y
B X
After a graph has been constructed according to the rules V1{V2 and E1{
E3, it is reduced using the following rules.
R1. Find all vertices that represent a long-term key.
R2. For each distinct path in G where the initial vertex represents a long-term
key and the terminating vertex represents the session key, mark all vertices
along the path.
R3. Remove from V (G) all unmarked elements.
R4. Remove from E(G) any element which one (or both) endpoints are no longer
in V (G).
In the resulting reduced graph, key-dependencies are represented as edges.
Intuitively, the graph shows possible weak links in the chain of keys involved in
a system (in so far as a decryption key can be called a weak link).
We interpret the resulting graph as follows:
I1. For all adjacent vertices representing data, the (contents of the) terminal
vertex depends on the (contents of the) initial vertex. We denote this depen-
dency by or-dependency.
I2. A vertex (f) representing a transformation depends on the union of all
vertices where there exist an edge so that f is the terminating vertex. We
denote this dependency by and-dependency.
In addition, dependency has the property of being transitive. We say that a
key-dependency exists in the protocol if there is at least one path in the reduced
graph
Below, ve protocols are analysed, both to demonstrate that the algorithm in-
deed captures key dependencies, and to evaluate the protocols for key-
dependencies.
3 Examples
In this section ve well-known protocols are analysed by means of the method
described in the previous section. As will be shown, these protocols give rise to
a varying degrees of key-dependencies.
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3.1 Wide-Mouthed-Frog Protocol
First the Wide-Mouthed-Frog protocol [3], a relatively simple protocol which
involves three parties. In this protocol, the two parties A and B each have a
secret key, shared with the authentication server S, KAS and KBS respectively.
This protocol consists of only two messages.
Message 1 A ! S : A; fTA; B;KABgKAS
Message 2 S ! B : fTS ; A;KABgKBS
When following the procedure outlined above, the following graph is obtained.
A; fTA; B;KABgKAS E1 //
E1

A KBS
E2
’’OO
OOO
OOO
OOO
O fTS ; A;KABgKBS
E2

fTA; B;KABgKAS E2 // TA; B;KAB
E1

E1 // KAB TS ; A;KAB
E1oo
E1

KAS
E2
55lllllllllllllll
TA; B TS ; A
The two messages that were sent have been framed for clarity. In addition, each
arch is labelled according to the rule that applies to it.
The long-term keys are KAS and KBS . Applying the rules R2{R3 yields the
following graph:
KAS // TA; B;KAB
&&LL
LLL
LLL
LL
TS ; A;KAB
xxrrr
rrr
rrr
r
KBSoo
KAB
By I1 the key KAB or-depends on TA; B;KAB and TS ; A;KAB. These de-
pends, again by I1, on two nodes containing long-term encryption keys. Recalling
that dependency is transitive, we interpret the graph to imply that KAB depends
on either one of two other keys, KAS and KBS . That is, knowing either KAS
or KBS will make it possible to recover KAB , provided that the attacker has
a recording of the protocol and the session. Consequently, in order to close a
session based on KAB, both KAS and KBS must be discarded (in addition to
KAB). However, both keys are known to S, which implies that A and B does
not control the closing of the session.
3.2 Node-to-node channel
Consider the protocol to set up a node-to-node channel between the two nodes A
and B in a distributed system [8]. The essence is that both A and B invent a ran-
dom number, the numbers are exchanged, and the session key is constructed as a
function of them. A and B are assumed to have public keys KA and KB , known
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to the other party, and both are competent to invent good random numbers.
The protocol is slightly simplied, see [8] for a complete description.
Message 1 A ! B : fJAgKB
Message 2 B ! A : fJBgKA
The session key KAB is then found as a hash of JA and JB . Building the graph
and reducing it, let h() indicate the hash function, gives the following graph:
K−1A // JA // h(JA; JB)

JBoo K
−1
B
oo
KAB
We notice that I1 does not apply to this graph. By I2 and transitivity, KAB
and-depends on K−1A and K
−1
B . Thus, to decrypt the session protected by KAB
both K−1A and K
−1
B (assuming both J ’s are discarded) need to be compromised.
3.3 SSL 3.0
SSL is a protocol designed to be used in a variety of circumstances and with
a variety of security environments, and with a variety of cryptographic tools2.
This protocol is widely used, in particular by Web-browsers. SSL can be used in
settings where both the client and server have public keys and mutual authen-
tication is desired. With some simplications (for example, only one method for
hashing), the protocol can be described as follows:
Message 1 C ! S : C;NC; TC
Message 2 S ! C : NS ; TS ; KS ; fNCgK−1
S
Message 3 C ! S : KC ; fP gKS ; fH(M + H(Z + M))gK−1C ;
H(M + H(YC + M))
Message 4 S ! C : H(M + H(YS + M))
In the protocol description, TS and TC are the time stamps, NS and NC are
28-byte nonces, and KS and KC are the public keys of the server and client,
respectively. The keys are sent together with X.509 certicates making claims
on the user-key binding [4]. P is the 46 bytes called \pre-master-secret", the
function H is MD5 [10], M is the master-secret derived from the pre-master-
secret by combining the pre-master-secret with NC and NS plus some padding,
and hashing the result. Z is the concatenation of Message 1 and Message 2, YC
is the concatenation of Z and the number 1129074260, YS is the concatenation
of Z, Message 3 and the number 1397904978. In essence, the parties sign each
others nonces.
2 A detailed description of SSL is available at URL:http://home.netscape.com/eng/-
ssl3/ssl-toc.html.
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When processed according to the graph reduction rules, the following is ob-
tained:
K−1S //P //M
Inspection of the reduced graph reveals that the secrecy of the master secret
depends solely on the secrecy of K−1S , which again implies that the client is
unable to close the session based on the master secret. Although SSL is based
upon public-key cryptography, its behavior with respect to key dependencies is
weaker that the Wide-Mouthed-Frog protocol. In the latter, the \users" have the
possibility to close the session by changing the key they share with the server.
In SSL, this is not possible. The analysis of SSL also demonstrates that the use
of public keys is not a panacea.
3.4 Demonstration Protocol
In [7], quite a few protocols are described, and in the following, the Demonstra-
tion Protocol is studied in more detail. It consists of eight messages sent between
two principals A and B and a security server S. The last three messages form an
exchange of nonces for verication, and are left out of the protocol description:
Message 1 A ! S : fA;B; na1; na2; ftagKASgKS
Message 2 S ! B : A;B
Message 3 B ! S : fB;A; nb1; nb2; ftbgKBSgKS
Message 4 S ! A : fna1; k  na2gKAS
Message 5 S ! B : fnb1; k nb2gKBS
The symbol  denotes the bit-wise exclusive-or operation, the datums prexed
by n’s are nonces, the key KS is the public key of S, the keys KAS and KBS
are shared between A (and B) and S, and k is the session key. The protocol is
slightly simplied|confounders are left out|see [7] for the details. In the graph,
the nodes denoted with ⊗ represent a computation as described by V2. In this
protocol, the computation is in fact bit-wise exclusive-or, but regarding it as a
general computation does not alter the graph.
The algorithm produces the following graph:
KAS

na2

K−1Soo // nb2

KBS

k  na2 // ⊗ // k ⊗oo k  na2oo
The two arches leading to k are or-dependencies, implying that k depends
on two sets of keys while, by I2, the arches to the transformations induce and-
dependencies implying that the key depends on all keys. However, the secret
key K−1S is a member of both sets. Furthermore, all keys represented in the
graph (KS ; KAS and KBS) are known to S and none of them are discarded after
Message 5 has been sent (after which S no longer takes part in the session). On
the other hand, compromise based on KAS (or KBS) alone is not enough.
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Compared to the Wide-Mouthed-Frog protocol, the outcome is better since
compromise of one of the user’s key is not enough to endanger the privacy of
the session. The outcome is better than that of SSL, in that if A and B both
change the key they share with S, the session is closed, while in SSL the session
key depends on K−1S alone.
3.5 Encrypted Key Exchange
From the previous examples, it is clear that key-dependencies arise when ses-
sion keys are encrypted with long-term keys. Using a fresh, temporary public
key avoids the key-dependency issue. As an example, the Encrypted Key Ex-
change [2] is described.
Let A and B be the two parties, P a shared secret, Kt a public key with
K−1t as the secret counterpart, and KAB a session key. The protocol consists of
ve messages, of which the last three are for mutual verication of the key; they
are left out. A creates the temporary public key pair (Kt; K−1t ) and sends Kt to
principal B. B creates the session key KAB and uses Kt to securely send KAB
to A. The rst two messages are:
Message 1 A ! B : A; fKtgP
Message 2 B ! A : ffKABgKtgP
The protocol gives rise to the following graph:
A; fKtgP
{{ww
ww
ww
ww
ww

P
zzuuu
uuu
uu
uu
u
&&LL
LLL
LLL
LLL
ffKABgKtgP

A Kt K
−1
t
&&LL
LLL
LLL
LL
fKABgKt

KAB
Reduction results in the following graph:
P // fKabgKt // KAB
First, notice that that the secret, temporary key K−1t is not included in the
graph since it is not a long-term key. Second, inspection of the graph reveals
that holding key P is not sucient to obtain the KAB because it does not come
to depend on the key K−1t . The graph, in its reduced form, captures this fact
by depicting a path from P to KAB which contains encrypted material whose
decryption key is not depicted. In other words, the graph captures the essence
in the protocol, that shared and public key encryption complement each other.
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4 Discussion and future work
The analysis of the ve protocols in the previous section reveals a clear relation-
ship between the use of shared-key encryption and key-dependencies. Without a
pre-arranged secret channel it is hard for participants to verify that a session key
indeed is correct [6]. This becomes evident in protocols based on shared keys,
where the session key must be exchanged over the shared channel as there is
no other alternative. In such settings, key-dependency is inevitable. This can be
argued for as follows: Assume two peer principals wanting to communicate and
exchange a session key by means of a security server. Based on the messages
sent, B must decide on the same session key as A. This is only possible if A can
assume that B’s actions are deterministically based on the input (the messages
sent by A and S). If C knows the algorithms that B follows, and can read the
channel to and from B, C will be able to achieve the same result as B. Thus, it
is impossible to avoid key-dependency in a system solely depending on shared
key encryption. The above analysis veries this.
By considering how dependencies arise it becomes evident that to improve
the situation with shared keys there must not exist a path in the graph from long-
term keys to the session key(s). That is, a cryptographic channel must exist that
is not transmitted. Today, public key cryptography is the most common choice
for such channels, but more exotic possibilities are possible, see for example [9].
However, as became evident in the analysis of SSL, protocols using public keys
can also give rise to key-dependencies.
In systems based on public key cryptography and where a trusted third party
is used to ease authentication, one can separate the issues of authentication from
the exchange of a session key. In particular, one can leave it to the users to handle
the latter. This approach, for more or less this reason, is taken in [8, Footnote
10] (and in [12]). When the server is not engaged in issuing the session key, no
key-dependency arises on some key known to the server. It is, however, regarded
as good engineering practice to involve a server in this process, see [3] and [1,
example 11.2].
Although the protocols analysed in this article were not designed with for-
ward secrecy in mind, it is still important to point out that key-dependency
vulnerabilities do exist in them. The design of SSL, for example, is considered
sound for authentication purposes, but as shown in this article, can be vulnerable
to attacks exploiting key-dependencies.
As it stands, the analysis must be carried out \by hand". Among the future
lines of work is an eort to parse a protocol description to build the graph di-
rectly. Also, processing|as in the Note-to-Node protocol|to obtain keys needs
attention as it is not captured in the messages that are sent.
5 Conclusions
As computers are used in an ever larger part of life, the importance of forward
secrecy becomes paramount. Key-dependencies have implications on a protocols’
forward secrecy, and a tool to analyse protocols has merits.
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In this paper, a structured method for analysing authentication protocols for
key-dependencies has been presented, and is usefulness has been demonstrated.
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